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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF
GEORGE R. POWELL,
Deceased.
CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, (Administrator)
and THE HEIRS OF FLORENCE
EUNICE POWELL,

Case No. 16,877

Respondents,
vs.
LAMAR P. WEST,
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for declaratory relief in a contested
probate where the administrator of the estate is seeking to
clarify its duties in distributing the assets of the decedent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, after a trial on the merits of apellant's objections to the respondent's petition, held that
the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
in Civil Number 7416 in the Fourth Judicial District Court
for Uintah County, were res judicata as to any claims for
relief requested by the appellant.

There being no other

objectors, the court granted the relief requested by the
respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company, seeks to
have this court affirm the lower court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although some of the facts cited in the appellant's
brief are true, there are no citations to the record supporting said facts as required by Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent will, therefore, set

forth the material facts of the case.
On July 2, 1974, the appellant filed a petition for admission of will to probate seeking to have herself appointed
as personal representative of the decedent's estate.

{R.2)

She contended that the will was valid (R.21), but other
heirs challenged venue (R.16-31, R.40-58). After the court
determined that the probate was properly commenced in Utah
County (R.65), the appellant testified a second time in
support of its admission to probate (R.77).

The will was

then admitted to probate, and the appellant was appointed
the executrix (R.83).
On October 6, 1975, the appellant resigned as the
executrix (R.106) and she and the other heirs nominated the
respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company as the administrator of the decedent's estate (R.95-109).

The respondent

was appointed by the court on February 18, 1976 (R.111).
Florence A. Powell of Vernal Utah, and Florence Eunice
Powell of Laural, Montana, asserted claims against the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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estate, asserting that they were both the same named beneficiary under the decedent's will.

Since it appeared that

there were conflicting claims against the estate, the respondent simultaneously filed a petition to determine heirship
in this probate (R.113), and a separate complaint and interpleader as Civil Number 44,913 in Utah County (R.290).

The

petition to determine heirship was held to be moot since the
complaint and interpleader were filed (R.129), and the complaint
and interpleader were later consolidated with this probate
matter (R.454).

At the time of the filing of the petition

to determine heirship, the appellant filed an affidavit
alleging that the co-respondent, Florence Eunice Powell of
Laurel, Montana, was the proper "Florence Powell" to receive
the bequest under the decedent's will.
Another action had been instituted in Uintah County as
Civil Number 7416, among all of the heirs of the decedent and
beneficiaries under his will, except Florence Eunice Powell
of Laurel, Montana.

On the basis of a stipulation made between

the parties in that action (R.228-238), the court entered
an order in this probate matter declaring the will null and
void, directing the respondent to proceed with the probate
of the estate as if the decedent had died intestate (R.142),
and to otherwise comply with the

stipulat~on

of the parties

as set forth in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment (R.150-159).
Since Florence Eunice Powell was not before the court,
the settlement stipulation as to "Florence Powell", was conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ditioned upon Florence A. Powell prevailing as the named
person in the will of the decedent (R.158, paragraph (h).
The complaint and interpleader was then tried by the
lower court.

The court ruled that Florence Eunice Powell of

Laurel Montana (now her assignees, she having died) was
the named "Florence Powell", and was entitled to the distribution intended for said person under the decedent's will
(R.181).

The respondent then filed the petition for declaratory
relief since there were conflicting orders and it wanted to
know how distribution was to be made among the competing
claimants (R.182-210).

The appellant filed an objection to

the respondent's motion claiming she did not understand the
stipulation when made two years previously, and further
seeking to raise other issues regarding distribution of the
estate settled two years previously (R.216).
After a trial on the merits of appellant's objections
to the respondent's petition, the court granted the relief
requested by the respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE RESPONDENT-ADMINISTRATOR IS A STAKEHOLDER FACED
WITH CONFLICTING COURT ORDERS.
The respondent, as the administrator of the estate of
George R. Powell, deceased, has the statutory duty to settle
and distribute the estate of the decedent.

This must be

done in accordance with the terms of any probated will or
court order §75-3-703 U.C.A., {see also predecessor staSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tutes, §75-11-2 and §75-11-3 U.C.A.).

It has responsibility

similar to that of a trustee, holding legal title to the decedent's property for the benefit of the heirs of the decedent
or the beneficiaries of his will.

§75-3-703

u. C.A.

Wilson v. Martinez, 76 Wyo 196, 301 P.2d 785 (1956).

c. f.
As

such, it has, in this matter, no claim to the assets of the
estate and is a mere stakeholder, but must ascertain who of
the competing claimants are to receive them.
The probate of the decedent's will was commenced by the
appellant prior to the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code.

She was appointed as the executrix of the decedent's

Will by court order dated October 21,

197~/(R.83).

The Utah

statute in force at that time governing contests of probated
wills provided in part as follows:
"Any person who has not contested a will • • •
may contest the same or the probate thereof at any
time within six months after the admission to probate, and not afterward; • • • " §75-3-12 U.C.A.
The Utah Supreme Court had an occasion to review that
statute in the two appeals of In Re Howard's Estate. 2 Ut.
2d 112, 269 P.2d 1049 (1954), and 3 Ut.2d 76, 278 P.2d 622
(1955).

In the first case, this court held on interlocatory

appeal, that the probate of the wills became final at the expiration of the six months period.

No contest could there-

after be brought as to their validity because the court lost
jurisdiction to entertain any such contest.
In the second Howard's Estate case, the inconsistent
instruments had been entered for probate and construed by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the lower court.

The Supreme Court was then faced with the

problem of constructing those inconsistent instruments.

Up-

holding its prior decision this court held:
" • • • since under the facts of this case it
can reasonably be found that the later instruments
did not dispose of the entire estate and are not
wholly inconsistent with each other the court did not
err in admitting all the instruments as the last will
and testament of the testatrix and in construing all
to be effective insofar as their dispositions are
consistent with each other, and where they are inconsistent that the later dispositions revoke the earlier.
2 Ut.2d at 82, 228 P.2d at 24.
Since the time for contest of the will filed by the
appellant had clearly passed before the respondent was
appointed the administrator of the estate, it had no choice
but to administer the estate of the decedent in accordance
with said will.

In fact, the 12 months period for contest

under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, §75-3-412 (3){c) U.C.A.,
had likewise expired before the appointment of respondent.
When the parties entered into the stipulation in Civil
Number 7416 in Uintah County, the appellant was a party
before the court, but Florence Eunice Powell of Laurel,
Montana was not.

The parties before the court in effect

agreed to let the estate pass by the laws of intestacy,
reserving the question of the amount passing to "Florence
Powell".

Since they could not bind her, the parties expressly

stipulated for the contingency of Florence Eunice Powell's
claim against the estate. Subparagraph lO(h) of the Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of law provided:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The settlement is conditioned upon the intervener or other litigant obtaining from the court a
determination by litigation or otherwise that Florence
Eunice Powell of Montana was and is not, the Florence
Powell named as executor and heir in the will of June
4, 1974. This matter is at issue before this court in
Uintah County. In the event that Florence Powell of
Montana shall establish that she is in fact an heir,
this stipulation insofar as it applies to the defendant
(who was Florence A. Powell) shall fail (R.158 insert
added).
After the lower court's determination that Florence
Eunice Powell of Laurel Montana was indeed the "Florence
Powell" under the decedent's will, the respondent was faced
with the tough choice of how much Florence Powell's share
was to be.

Since it appears that the administrator could

not contest the validity of the will as cited above, and the
court had ruled that the estate was to pass by intestacy as
to all of the parties except "Florence Eunice Powell" of
Laurel Montana, the respondent's only recourse was to seek
court approval of any distribution of the estate.
POINT II
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER METHOD TO RESOLVE
CONFLICTING ORDERS OF THE COURT WHERE THE APPEAL PERIOD HAS
PASSED.
Section 75-3-1001 U.C.A. provides for a method to approve
a distribution scheme proposed by a personal representative.
Said section is akin to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and §78-33-1 u.c.A. et. seq.

In fact, §78-33-2

and §78-33-4 U.C.A. have expressed statutory language providing for the constuction of wills and the legal rights
between parties arising therefrom.

Finally, that chapter

provides the following guideline in determining the scope of
matters that
may properly be brought before the court:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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_..,_

"This chapter is declared to be remedial; its
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal
relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered."
§78-33-12 U.C.A. See also: Citizen's Committee v. Marston,
109 Ariz 188, 507 P.2d 113 (1973); Toncray v. Dolan, 593 P.2d
956 (Colo 1979); and State v. Lanton, 523 P.2d 1064 (Okl 1974).
In light of the remedial nature of the statute and the
conflicting orders of the court, it was only proper for the
respondent administrator to seek the assistance of the court
by bringing the petition for declaratory relief.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT'S ATTACK ON THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS
OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
The appellant spends considerable time in her brief
discussing the issues of her testimony at the time of trial
on the respondent's motion for declaratory judgment.

None

of these allegations, however, are properly before this
court since the appellant has failed to designate a transcript of that testimony she is trying to further.
On appeal it is the duty of the Supreme Court to sustain
rulings made if it can be done, even though it may be upon
matters not even urged on appeal.
266 570 P.2d 523 (1973).
P.2d 118 (1975).

Peterson v. Fowler 29 Ut.2d

See also Sears v. Ogden City, 533

Though this court will not reverse a lower

court's decision on errors claimed for the first time on
appeal, this court has stated that it will affirm a lower
court's judgment if sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent in the record.

Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n,

23 Ut.2d 222, 461 P.2d 290 (1969).
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The respondent contends, however, that the appellant has
failed to raise any persuasive arguments on appeal which
attack the lower court's decision.

Instead, she has referred

to numerous facts which are not a part of the record on
appeal, and are in some instances being raised for the first
time on appeal.
The issues of her lack of understanding of the stipulation entered in Civil Number 7416, her purported ownership
of two certificates of deposit totaling $70,000, her purported ownership of the boat and motor-home, and her purported ownership of the $20,000 "trust fund" were all raised
by her pleadings and were heard at the time of the trial.

It

is from the court's findings regarding those issues that she
is appealing; yet, she offers no evidence other than her

allegations to refute the court's findings.

The Supreme

Court has no alternative but to sustain the trial court's
determination on those issues since it does not have any
evidence before it to contradict the court's findings.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE PRIOR
CIVIL CASE WAS RES JUDICATA AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
A judgment based on a stipulation is res judicata as
to the issues submitted to the court.

In Re Evans, 42 Ut.

282, 130 P. 217 (1913); Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Ut. 428,
132 P.2d 111 (1942); and McCarthy v. State, Ut.2d 205,
265 P.2d 387 (1953).

For questions which are material to the merits of the
case which are considered in a former opinion, the court's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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judgment is binding as to such questions.

In such cases, a

determination of the merits or a stipulation uncontested
after entry, is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent
action under the same or a different cause of action.

See

generally 49 A.L.R. 2d 1031, section 8.
Furthermore, a party is bound by his judicial declaration and may not contradict them in subsequent actions or
proceedings.

This is true of witnesses in prior and sub-

sequent litigation involving even different parties.

Strum v.

Boker, 150 U.S. 312, and Loomis v. Church, 76 Ida. 87, 277
P.2d 56 (1954).

In the absence of inadvertance or misappre-

hensive as to law, one who takes a position in one case as
to the facts will be estopped to deny or alter such position
or statement in a subsequent action although the parties may
not be the same.

Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v. Openshaw Invest-

ment Co., 102 Ut. 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1943).

See also Hatton

Realty Co. v. Baylus, 42 Wyo. 69, 190 P.561 (1930).
In this case on appeal, the appellant would have the
Supreme Court remove the res judicata effect of her prior
stipulation and the court's prior independent findings.

In

fact, she is seeking to have "the entire probate proceeding
remanded with instructions to have the entire probate retried
and all of the matters pertaining to this estate reheard."
The reason for the doctrine of res adjudicata is to bar
the assertion of just this type of claim.

The appellant had

her day in court in the civil case in Uintah County.
to exercise her appeal rights from that decision.

She failed

She is in
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fact stipulated in open court to the very order she is now
attacking.

The trial court was correct in holding that the

prior order was res judicata to the appellant's claim.
CONCLUSION
Even though the respondent, Central Bank and Trust
Company as administrator of the estate of George R. Powell,
deceased, is a mere stakeholder, it has the statutory duty
to determine how the assets of the estate are to be distributed.

When faced with conflicting court orders, it is

proper for the administrator to seek court assistance in
the form of declaratory judgment in determining how such distributions are to be made.

The appellant's attack on the

lower court's findings can not be maintained on appeal since
she has offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict those
findings.

Finally, the trial court correctly applied the

doctrine of res judicata to the appellant's attempt to
avoid the prior court's orders, including her own stipulat ion.
The respondent respectfully requests this court to
affirm the lower court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

~day

of June, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

L.VALE~~

RD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
orneys for RespondentAdministra tor
120 East 300 North,
Provo, Utah 84601
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